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Abstract
There is little doubt about whether social networks play a role in modern protests. This agree-
ment has triggered an entire research avenue, in which social structure and content analysis have
been central –but are typically exploited separately.
Here, we combine these two approaches to shed light on the opinion evolution dynamics in Egypt
during the summer of 2013 along two axes (Islamist/Secularist, pro/anti-military intervention). We
intend to find traces of opinion changes in Egypt’s population, paralleling those in the international
community –which oscillated from sympathetic to condemnatory as civil clashes grew. We find
little evidence of people “switching” sides, along with clear changes in volume in both pro- and
anti-military camps.
Our work contributes new insights into the dynamics of large protest movements, specially in
the aftermath of the main events –rather unattended previously. It questions the standard nar-
rative concerning a simplistic mapping between Secularist/pro-military and Islamist/anti-military.
Finally, our conclusions provide empirical validation to sociological models regarding the behavior
of individuals in conflictive contexts.
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I. INTRODUCTION
When Time magazine nominated the anonymous protester as the Person of the Year in
2011, it was already clear that online technologies occupied (and occupy) a central spot as the
backbone of modern civil protests. Beyond that cycle of turmoil, subsequent events have only
reinforced such impression. Public availability and down-to-the-second temporally resolved
data have given Twitter an incomparable advantage in addressing important questions, for
instance how social networks actually facilitate the emergence and diffusion of protests [18],
or how their contents change in time.
This is of particular importance in the Middle-East and North Africa (MENA) region,
where chronic political unrest is combined with a speeded adoption of online technologies.
Furthermore, the rapid growth of social networking sites since 2011 shifts away from typical
social and entertainment uses of online media, towards those that are more political and civic
[21]. Indeed, recent turmoil in MENA countries has provided good case studies for online
interaction: Iran (2009), Tunisia, Lybia, Egypt and Bahrain (2011), Palestine and Israel
(ongoing Gaza conflict) and Syria (2011-present), have witnessed social revolts, violence
and even some government changes. And in all of those, online social networks have been
claimed to have a key role.
Since 2011, Egypt’s society is known to be highly polarized with the two dominant poles
typically labeled as “Islamist” and “Secularist”. On top of this, the country has experienced
much political upheaval during the past year. In such heavily polarized atmosphere, the
movement named “Tamarod” (meaning Rebellion in Arabic) was incepted in Egypt aiming
to overthrow president Morsi a few months into his presidency. The efforts of the movement
culminated in mass demonstrations and counter-demonstrations on June 30, 2013 and re-
sulted in military intervention (coup or revolution[40]) to displace Morsi on July 3, 2013.
The military takeover and ensuing opposition to it has led to significant tension and much
violence. As a result, a new pro- vs. anti-military intervention dimension has emerged.
This latter axis has been widely considered in mass media to be aligned with the previous
polarization, in the sense that Islamist/Secularist coincide with anti-military/pro-military,
respectively. However, during the violent aftermath of the army’s ascent to power, some
observers speculated that some of the supporters of the military intervention might have
changed their opinion, due to what is mostly viewed –including international observers– as
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excessive use of force against protesters, with at least several hundred killed.
In this paper, we examine how these events have transpired on Twitter and some of the
underlying phenomena. One angle that we are particularly interested in is one of changes
in volume or “loudness” of different political camps over time and if these were driven by
opinion changes. This question is partly motivated by the fact that “the winds turned”
several times for the Muslim Brotherhood, and foreign governments were also struggling to
decide which side to support [1].
In particular, we attempt to address some inter-related research questions which –we
hypothesize– can be tackled using large amounts of Twitter data. First, we examine whether
“opinion switching” between both camps can be detected and estimated. If so, we can move
on and question further whether perceived opinion changes are due to (i) people actually
switching sides, or (ii) the relevant camps becoming increasingly louder or more muted.
In quantifying the answer to these questions, we learn about the underlying psychological
and sociological mechanisms which are at play in conflictive contexts. For instance, it might
be more benefitial –or less costly– for an individual to withdraw from an ongoing conflict
than to actually switch sides: with a similarly minded social neighborhood, an actor is
faced with the “volunteer’s dilemma” (in this case, who switches side first); from which the
rational outcome is to become mute [10].
Beyond partial accounts, we approach these questions both from the structural (network)
side and the semantic (content) side. Concerning content, we used a set of manually labeled
hashtags to build a pro- or anti-military-intervention classifier, which is used to classify
tweets based on its textual content. On the network side, we used retweets of hand-labeled
seed users to derive a Secular vs. Islamist leaning for users. We apply our methodology on a
set of nearly 6 million Arabic tweets crawled between June 21 and September 30, 2013. From
these, we reconstructed the network of Twitter users who authored tweets in the collection,
and we crawled all meta information for 120,000 users along with their latest 3,200 tweets
prior to December 2013. All the tweets and Twitter user IDs in our collection are publicly
available[41], so that researchers can replicate the exact dataset we used for possible future
studies.
We are well aware that studies conducted solely on Twitter data have certain limitations
and drawbacks. From a general point of view, Twitter can not be regarded as the voice
of civil society. As a matter of fact, Twitter (and online social networks in general) have
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been adopted by a minority in these societies. Furthermore, the adoption of these new
technologies are not uniformly spread, which implies that the data are, most probably,
biased. And yet, we are confident that our study stands on a reliable ground. Though
limited, Twitter is a valuable monitor of social dynamics and it is doubtless an influencing
actor in modern societies, partially shaping the flow of information among individuals and, in
many occasions, performing as an agenda-setting actor. Methodologically, our longitudinal
approach tracks not absolute values (raw signal), but rather relative changes (first derivative
of the signal) which diminish the impact of inherent biases. Whereas biases are expected to
strongly impact the absolute level of, say, Morsi support on Twitter, trends and the direction
of changes in this level are expected to be more robust.
We find that despite –or because of– the dramatic and violent events there is very little
evidence of users changing sides or “switching”. We look at switching between Secularist
and Islamist camps and between pro-military and anti-military camps. Our network and
content analyses indicate that less than 5% of users switched sides. Instead, the main
narrative seems to be one of pro-military intervention and Secular users being dominant
in terms of volume leading up to July 3, and anti-military intervention and Islamist users
gaining in volume afterwards. Furthermore, in contradiction to the dominating narrative in
mass media, the correlation between being a secular and a supporter of military intervention
is far from perfect. However, some correlation was noticed between being an Islamist and
against the military intervention.
II. EGYPT’S COUP D’ETAT: TIMELINE
In this section, we summarize the major events that unfolded in Egypt during the summer
of 2013. In general, we can distinguish three major periods: the lead up to the June
30 protests; the military intervention on July 3; and the aftermath of the intervention,
including the violent crackdown against the Rabia sit-in. The chronology should help in
understanding the conflict in the time period that we cover. We also invite the reader to
have a look at a Wikipedia article on the topic[42] and an Al-Jazeera interactive timeline
tool for the Egyptian turmoil[43] for more information.
The major events were as follows:
• Late April, 2013: A movement named Tamarod started in an effort to force the
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Egyptian president Mohamed Morsi out of office. The movement, which called for
mass protests on June 30, 2013, claimed to have collected 22 million signatures by
June 29. It was aided by strong media support and major power and gas crises [44].
Tamarod is often branded as a Secularist or pro-military movement.
• June 28 and 30: Large anti-Morsi protests take place in Cairo and across the country.
Counter-demonstrations in support of Morsi also begin with major sit-ins in Rabia and
Nahda squares. The sit-ins continue non-stop until they are disbanded on August 14.
Morsi supporters are often branded as Islamists.
• July 1: The military issues a two-day ultimatum to the Egyptian president to accept
the demands of Tamarod and to call for early presidential elections.
• July 2: The president, in an address to the nation, concedes to some demands from
Tamarod. However, he refuses to step down or to call for early elections [45].
• July 3: General Sisi, the head of the military, orchestrates a coup to overthrow the
president, suspend the constitution, disband the elected legislature, arrest Morsi’s most
prominent supporters, and shutdown pro-Islamist television stations. A new interim
president is appointed. Protests in support of Morsi continue and grow.
• July 8: Clashes between security forces and anti-coup protestors erupt in front of a
National Guard compound leading to many deaths.
• July 24: General Sisi asks his supporters to demonstrate, so as to obtain a “mandate”
to fight “possible terrorism”.
• July 26: Pro-military protests take place in Tahrir square in response to General
Sisi’s demands.
• July 27: Clashes between security forces and anti-coup protestors erupt near Rabia
square, leading to the death of dozens (mostly demonstrators).
• August 14: Security forces crack-down on the sit-ins, leading to the death of hundreds
of anti-coup protesters. Demonstrators attempt to establish new sit-ins, but these are
as well violently disbanded.
5
• August 16: Major anti-coup protests take place, leading again to the death and
arrest of many protesters.
Besides the previous specific dates, protests and clashes are intensified on Fridays (prayer
day for Muslims) with continuing sit-ins in Rabia and Nahda squares up until August 14.
III. RELATED WORK
For a helpful contextualization of our work, we focus on three research avenues. First, a
general framework is that of temporally resolved social dynamics, i.e. works in which scholars
attempt to track the evolution of social phenomena (as opposed to a static snapshot). Within
this area, we highlight the studies that zoom in on political events: the growth of grassroots
movements, recruitment processes and (bi)polarization of opinions. A second major area
–indeed with much work devoted to it– is that of the Arab world, digital media and/or the
political/civic use of it. Third, we briefly discuss sociological accounts of opinion dynamics
–“switches” and silencing.
In the first line of research, it is possible to identify some works which provide longitudinal
accounts of political (protest) events. Some examples are the work by Borge and collabora-
tors [9] (devoted to the growth of the “Indignados” movement in Spain) or Gonza´lez-Bailo´n
et al. [19] (recruitment processes again in the 2011 protests in Spain). But closer to the
current approach, we pay attention to Weber et al.’s work [36, 37], who explore the bipo-
lar political scenario in Egypt (Secular vs. Islamist). To do so, they track the retweeting
behavior from certain seed users as a signal to deduce a user’s political orientation. Fur-
thermore, they transfer the polarity from users to hashtags based on usage patterns –such
that a hashtag is tagged as Islamist, Secular or “neutral”. In doing so, the authors provide
a means to assess real-time online polarization. They provide anecdotal evidence that the
increases in this polarity score anticipate periods of political violence.
Needless to say, polarization has been a focus of interest before. Starting with the NOM-
INATE score [32], to quantify the statement that U.S. politics follows a 1-dimensional left-
to-right schema, much research has followed. Focusing on digital media and U.S.-centered
politics (i.e. left-vs.-right polarization), Adamic et al. [4] and Conover et al. [12] capitalized
on data from the blogosphere and Twitter respectively. The time-resolved retweet graphs
constructed from our data set present some similarities to Adamic’s work; and yet, the
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temporal dimension is missing in these articles.
Second, there is a large body of work on the so-called Arab Spring, some of which zoom
in on the Egyptian Revolution in particular. These depart from the present work insofar
they typically include some discussion on the role of social media during the protests and
the revolution, but do not use data from social networks (nor Twitter in particular) to
approach polarization or major events. A notable exception is work by Mostak [29], who
tests the political hypotheses that “Islamism in an ideology of the poor” with online data. To
approach the question, he looks for geographical correlations between census information for
income and house value/size, and estimates for how much Islamist activity on Twitter there
is originating from a particular region. Down to conflictive situations, we find a plethora of
works devoted to the Arab Spring –as the expression “Twitter Revolution” was coined and
settled in mass media: some examples can be found in [6, 7, 23, 24, 31, 34], often from a
qualitative point of view or relying on surveys. With the use of data from blogs, Al-Ani et
al. [5] explore alternative news sources –beyond the government-supplied versions of events.
However, none of them quantifies online polarization, or provide a longitudinal point of
view. Other countries and conflicts have of course caught the attention of researchers, such
as Tunisia [39] and Palestine [38]. Closer to this work, Choudhary et al. [11] performed
time-resolved sentiment and response analysis to Twitter activity during the events in 2011,
that eventually led to the displacement of Mubarak and the onset of a transitional period.
Apparently, they used English tweets coming from Egypt and relevant news sources. In our
work, we focus on Arabic tweets –clearly underrepresented in scholarly articles– to better
model people in the region.
Finally, we find literature that focuses on the monitoring of opinion changes and the
existence of online “silent crowds”. Far from the political debate, some researchers have
tried to tackle the fundamental differences between the “vocal minority” and the “silent
majority” [30]. In this work, a caveat is placed to consider the significant differences between
those highly active online media users –who dominate the ongoing discussions over social
networks– and the vast majority of people who participate much less frequently. The same
line of argumentation is found in Venkataraman et al. [35]. A step closer to our politically
motivated work, Lin et al. [25] exploit sentiment analysis to track political opinions in U.S.
–although their method is intended for general purposes. Common to our framework, a
real-time, evolving opinion-shift account is offered. Finally, on a more theoretical ground,
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the work by Chenoweth et al. [10] suggests that there are indications that, in a conflictive
environment, members of opposing groups do not necessarily switch sides to tip the balance
in favor of one of the groups, but they may merely withdraw their support.
IV. DATA COLLECTION
A. Collecting Relevant Egyptian Tweets
We collected Arabic tweets in the period between June 21, 2013 and September 30, 2013.
This period covers the major events in the aforementioned chronology. We used Twitter4J
APIs[46] to collect the tweets matching the query “lang:ar”, (so as to retrieve Arabic tweets).
On average, the number of collected tweets per day was 3 million. The Arabic text of the
collected tweets was pre-processed using state-of-the-art normalization technique for social
Arabic text [15] to facilitate later filtering. The normalization includes letter normalization,
diacritics removal, decorative text replacement and word elongation compression.
To extract the tweets that are relevant to Egypt, we constructed a rich set of Boolean
queries that cover different facets of Egyptian politics. The set contained 112 requests that
represent key players in the Egyptian political sphere: government representatives, political
parties, opposition leaders, media anchors and the Twitter accounts of some relevant players.
Each Boolean request is prepared to handle different spellings of names, acronyms, and nick-
names used by different political groups. As such, an enriched set of queries underlies every
request in order to retrieve relevant tweets from the Arabic news platform TweetMogaz[47]
[16, 26]. TweetMogaz automatically generates news about Egypt, taking Twitter as the
source. By default, the platform uses 84 queries and applies an adaptive tracking algorithm
to enrich them, relying on ongoing news [27]. For this work, we manually revised the
automatically enriched keywords to ensure a high precision and recall. On top of that, we
also considered context keywords, i.e. relevant to that particular period: “revolution”, “June
30”, “coup”, “Rabia” and “massacre”. This extra set was picked by two native Egyptian,
who regarded these words as most meaningful to the studied turmoil episode.
The number of extracted tweets matching those queries during the mentioned time win-
dow was 5.9 million. To ascertain the accuracy of the matching items, we manually judged
a set of 500 random tweets, from which only 5 were assessed as not relevant, rendering a
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FIG. 1: Distribution of the collected tweets about Egypt over time
99% estimated accuracy. Figure 1 shows the volume of tweets collected on the filtered set
over time. As expected, major events led to peaks in the number of tweets on the days they
occurred. There is clear mapping between the peaks in Figure 1 and the events listed in
the timeline section (see above), which hints at the fact that Twitter is –among others– a
faithful and sensitive monitor of real-world (offline) life.
B. Collecting Users’ Network Data
We identified Twitter accounts that authored/retweeted more than 10 tweets in our
collection, to find out their network information for network analysis. In doing so, we
guarantee that the monitored users did engage, at some time or another, the ongoing crisis
in Egypt. This led to the identification of nearly 120,000 Twitter accounts, out of roughly
1 million in our collection of Egyptian tweets. For each user, we extracted their network
information, which comprehends the number of followers, friends and, most importantly,
the last 3,200 tweets they authored or retweeted. These latest tweets allowed us to measure
the network dynamics of each user through their activities including retweets, mentions,
or replies to other accounts. The resulting information exceeded 750GB of user data and
more than 300 million tweets for these users. Table I summarizes the obtained tweets data
collection.
V. CONTENT-BASED ANALYSIS OF TWEETS
In this section, we describe the analysis we conducted on tweets, based on their textual
content. To this end, we built a supervised classifier that groups tweets according to their
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Data Description Included Information Size
Egyptian tweets Egyptian tweets be-
tween June 21 and
October 1, 2013
Tweet ID, text, Twitter user,
and Timestamp
5,902,086 tweets
User Data Profiles of Twitter
users with more than
10 tweets in the Egyp-
tian tweets set.
Username, screen name,
ID, number of fol-
lowers and followees.
List of last 3,200 posted tweets
by the account (prior to the mid
of December 2013)
121,003 profiles.
Recent 3,200 tweets
per profile
TABLE I: Tweets data collection used in our study
content, i.e. whether they express support (pro-MI: pro-military intervention) or opposition
(anti-MI) to the military intervention, plus a “neutral” category as well. We use this classifier
to measure the response to the events in the time window of interest. Later, we deepen our
analysis to track for possible opinion changes at the individual level.
A. Classifying Tweets as Pro/Anti-Military Intervention
The design of the classifier comprehends three main steps. First, we constructed lists of
seed hashtags that are either exclusively or predominantly used by either of the two groups.
Then, we expanded those lists to identify more tweets that could potentially belong to either
group. Finally, we employed a supervised method to classify the tweets.
For the first step (seed lists), we extracted the most frequent hashtags in our collection,
which were then tagged as either most likely pro-MI or anti-MI group. The rest of hashtags
were neglected. Briefly, we assumed pro-MI hashtags to express support for the army, calls
for a regime change or a revolution (as opposed to coup), opposition to Morsi or his regime or
attacks against the Muslim brotherhood. Conversely, the group of hashtags categorized as
anti-MI expressed maligning the members of the Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF),
the usage of military coup (as opposed to revolution), expression of support for Morsi or his
regime, or rejection to the crackdown against the sit-ins. The lists contained the highest
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frequent 150 hashtags for each polarity, see Table II for some examples.
With the seed lists at hand, we heuristically classified tweets in our collection as belonging
to the pro-MI or anti-MI groups if they exclusively contained hashtags belonging to the
corresponding lists, for either of the groups. If a tweet contained no hashtags indicating
polarity or contained hashtags from both lists, it was discarded. Using the filtered tweets,
we identified new words and hashtags that exclusively appeared in either group, but not in
both. We recursively added these words and hashtags to their respective lists. We repeated
this expansion step four times. The resultant lists for the pro-MI or anti-MI group lists
contained 1,105 and 1,487 words and hashtags respectively. Exploiting these final filtering
lists, we constructed a subset of the tweet collection containing 12% of the tweets in the
whole dataset.
Finally, from the filtered tweets subset we randomly selected 500 tweets containing hash-
tags from each list. These 1,000 tweets were manually verified and judged as exclusively
belonging to pro-MI, anti-MI or neutral. Judgments were performed by two Egyptian Arabic
speakers, who are keenly aware of the situation in Egypt. The inter-annotator agreement
between them was above 93%. In case of disagreement, the annotators discussed over the
tweets until consensus was reached. After this process, the agreement exceeded 96%. For
the remaining tweets (33), one of the judgments was selected at random. Table III shows the
distribution of the 1,000 tweets over the three groups. We used a multi-class Support Vector
Machine (SVM) classifier to classify tweets as pro-MI, anti-MI, or neutral. We employed the
SVMLight Multiclass implementation [13] for classification. We used the following features:
word unigrams, word bigrams, and hashtags. We performed 20 fold cross validation over our
1,000 labeled tweets where each fold (containing 5% of the examples) was used for testing
and the 19 other folds (containing 95% of the examples) were used for training. The average
accuracy for the folds was 87.0% with a standard deviation of 3.4%. Table IV shows the
classifier confusion between the guessed and actual tags.
Though the undetermined tweets may contain pro-MI or anti-MI tweets, our interest
focuses on finding the distribution of tweets belonging to both groups over time. Thus we
favored precision. Figure 2 plots the proportion of tweets that were classified as opposing
(anti-MI: blue) or supporting (pro-MI: orange) the military intervention over time. As
illustrated in Figure 2, before the military intervention on July 3 the proportion of tweets
belonging to the pro-MI group was dominant (55% to 75%). After July 3, pro-MI tweets
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Pro-MI Anti-MI 
Hashtag Translation Hashtag Translation 
#يسسم_اي_لحزا Step down Morsi #noscaf No SCAF (army) 
#لطبلا_يسيسلا Sisi the hero #نئاخ_يسيسلا Sisi traitor 
# _هزوث03وينوي_  30 June revolution #بلاقنلاا_دض Against coup 
#نيبذاكلا_ناوخلاا    Muslim brotherhood liars # حبرمةعباز_ة  Rabia massacre 
 
TABLE II: Examples of seeding hashtags used for Pro/Anti-military classifier
Pro-MI Neutral Anti-MI
35% 9% 56%
TABLE III: Distribution of tags in training/test set
witnessed a significant drop, while anti-MI tweets rose substantially. This can be attributed
to many different reasons that we attempt to analyze in the next section.
FIG. 2: Proportion of tweets per day according to polarity of supporting/opposing military inter-
vention
Given the content of our filtered collection, we analyze the top used hashtags by each
group over time. We do so in order to understand the topics of interest for each of the
12
guess
Truth Pro-MI Neutral Anti-MI
Pro-MI 0.817 0.064 0.119
Neutral 0.125 0.736 0.139
Anti-MI 0.054 0.022 0.924
TABLE IV: Confusion between truth and guessed labels for classes
groups and how they evolved in response to major events. We identified the 30 hashtags
that achieved the highest per-day volumes for any of the days in the full period, for both
groups. We eliminated hashtags, such as #Egypt, that were mentioned everyday, achieving
the highest aggregate volume over all the days –but never exhibited a burst in volume for
any given day. Using this scheme, a hashtag that is mentioned 10,000 times in one day is
more important than another that is mentioned 1,000 times daily over a span of 100 days.
A hashtag showing a spike in volume would likely indicate changes in topics or interest for
groups. Figure 3 shows the number of occurrences of the identified 30 hashtags in the period
of study. The upper panel shows the most frequent hashtags on the pro-MI group, while
the lower panel is devoted to the most frequent ones on the anti-MI group. Surprisingly,
the overlap between hashtags representing the topics discussed by each group is almost
nonexistent. Only four (out of 30) hashtags are in common in the two groups (#Morsi,
#Sisi, #Rabia, and #Beltagy). However, the use of these hashtags were different in scale,
time periods, and sentiment.
Upon inspection of the tweets and hashtags of the pro-MI group, they are focused more
on individuals and organizations. The top hashtag is #Morsi. The use of the tag peaked
around his ousting on July 3, and the relative volume of the hashtag for the rest of the period
continued to be high. Similarly, tweets critically mentioning #Ikhwan (Muslim Brotherhood)
persisted with relatively high volume for the whole period. #Tamarod peaked around Moris’s
deposition, but dwindled quickly afterwards. Other pro-MI tweets belonging to persons or
organizations included support for #Sisi (the head of the military), attacks directed at
#Tawakkol Karman (Yemeni Nobel prize laureate who was critical of the military takeover)
or joy at the arrest of #Beltagy (former parliamentarian and a prominent anti-MI figure).
Other prominent hashtags can be found related to criticism towards the sit-ins in #Rabia,
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 #Morsi 
#Tamarod #Sisi 
#Morsi 
#Emirats 
#Sisi 
#National_Guard_Massacre #Rabia_Adawia_Massacre #Rabia_Crackdown_Massacre 
#Egypt_against_Coup 
#Rabia_Massacre 
#End_Friday 
#Defeating_the_Coup #Beltagy 
#Sisi 
#Ikhwan 
#Tawakkol_Karman #Beltagy 
#Subway_Sit-in 
#Rabia 
#Rabia 
#People_Protecting_their_Revolution 
#Dilga 
Pro-MI 
Anti-MI 
FIG. 3: Number of occurrences of the most outstanding 30 hashtags appeared in the pro-MI (upper)
and anti-MI (lower) tweets between 21 June and 30 Sep. 2013. Note the scale for the anti-MI plot,
which is 10 times the scale of the pro-MI graph. Presented hashtags are translations of the original
Arabic ones.
with a peak on August 14, and of the #subway sit-in, with a peak on September 15.
Anti-MI tweets and hashtags instead focused mostly on events, particularly those in-
volving violence and loss of life (#National Guard Massacre, July 8), #Rabia Massacre,
#Rabia, #Rabia Adawia Massacre, #Rabia Crackdown Massacre (July 27 and August
14) and #Dilga (September 16). They also include hashtags for announced protests
on specific days or weeks, with activities against the military (#Defeating the Coup
on July 8; #Egypt against Coup, August 2; #Last Friday, August 8; or #Peo-
ple Protecting their Revolution, September 6). The most mentioned individuals in tweets
where #Morsi, mostly around the time of his ouster, general #Sisi, distributed over the
entire period, and #Beltagy, around the time of his arrest.
B. Detecting Users Polarity Switching
With a reliable classifier at hand, which provides content-based polarity classification,
we can observe the changes in polarity at the Twitter user-level over time. A user polarity
switch means that a user who was tweeting pro-MI tweets at t0 moved to authoring anti-MI
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tweets at t1 > t0, or viceversa. We apply this analysis to understand whether this was the
reason behind the large decline in the number of pro-MI tweets after the military intervention
on July 3 as shown in Figure 2 and the increase in anti-MI tweets.
Two hypotheses are compatible with the observed pattern changes, namely: people
switched camps in response to events; or, simpler, one camp became quieter while the other
becoming louder. We envisage that the latter is the mechanism behind the phenomenon –in
accordance with previous literature [10]. And yet empirical evidence is lacking in a violent
context, thus the relevance of the present work.
Detecting switch in user’s political leaning requires a minimum number of tweets of that
user over the studied period to monitor his leaning over time. The confidence of detecting
a switch in leaning increases the larger the number of pro/anti-MI tweets are examined for
a given user: more tweets supply more evidence of the user’s leaning. Unfortunately, most
of the users in our collection did not have large number of tweets classified as pro/anti-
MI. Therefore, we relied on a small portion of users who had at least n classified tweets,
n ∈ {5, 10, 15, 20}. Examining leaning switch of users based on only 5 tweets might be
inaccurate, however this leads to the examination of more users in our test set; whereas
examining users with at least 20 tweets in our collection leads to a smaller test set, though
yielding a higher confidence.
To consider a user polarity switch, we examined the first and last third of tweets for
the user. If the average polarity changed from the first third compared to the last third,
we assume that the user swapped her leaning. Otherwise, we consider that the user held a
coherent (stable) opinion over time. Figure 4 reports the percentage of used switched from
anti-MI to pro-MI, or vice versa, and presents the number of users examined in the analysis
for different values of n. As shown, for all n values, which reflects different confidence levels,
the number of user switching sides are minimal, where it did not exceed 5% of the total
number of users examined. For example, the largest percentage when n = 5, out of 21,312
users examined, only 970 switched from pro-MI to anti-MI, and 280 switched from anti-MI
to pro-MI. The percentage of switching is even less for larger n values, indicating that the
higher percentages for smaller n might causes by random noise in the classifier. In all the
switches, the number of users switched against the military intervention are at least triple
the number of users switched to support the military intervention.
Our “first third, last third” schema is admittedly an arbitrary one. There are, however,
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at least two good reasons to proceed in this way. First, an opinion change might not occur
in a sudden way, but rather progressively (as events unfold). Thus, it is necessary to focus
the attention on the initial opinion state and the final one, with some unobserved time in
between. In doing so, we avoid the presence of noise that might “contaminate” our output.
For this reason, a 1
2
− 1
2
schema would not yield a reliable result (despite its providing larger
statistics). In the opposite extreme, a more refined method would be to consider a small
initial and final tweeting period (first 1
10
th, last 1
10
th, for instance). We would have obtained
a more robust result, at the expense of poor statistics.
Table V presents some example tweets (translated from Arabic) for users who switched
their polarity. Example 1 in the table is for a Twitter user who was calling for protests
against Morsi on June 21, and then he was calling for participation in a march against what
he called the military coup on July 19. Similarly, the second example is from pro-MI to
anti-MI. On July 4, he expressed approval for the overthrow of Morsi, but then on July 24,
he attacked General Sisi[48] for his request for a “mandate”. The final example is for a user
who switched from anti-MI to pro-MI, where the user showed some solidarity for protestors
against military intervention, then after two and half months he showed support for Sisi and
opposition to Morsi.
Although the detected user switches are interesting, they can overall be considered anec-
dotic: the majority of users tend to express stable opinions. Thus, it can be concluded that
the significant changes in polarity proportions in Figure 2 are due to supporters of military
intervention becoming quieter and the opponents becoming louder.
VI. NETWORK-BASED ANALYSIS OF TWEETS
From the data collected we built a sequence of temporally-evolving networks (one per
day). In these networks, a weighted directed link (i, j, w) is laid between two nodes if user i
retweeted a previous tweet by j a number of times w. We used a 3-days overlapping sliding
window scheme, where the network on day t is obtained by aggregating 3 days of activity,
i.e. retweets from t− 1 to t+ 1; and the network on day t+ 1 spans from t to t+ 2, and so
on. This has some advantages, namely: a 3-day wide aggregation guarantees that retweeting
patterns will reflect a certain stability –away from the noisy immediacy of events; also, the
overlapping scheme allows for a finer tracking of ongoing events.
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FIG. 4: Percentage of users switched from one polarity to the other, and the number of users used
for the analysis of switching for different values of n
In general, the sequence of retweet-reconstructed networks exhibit some fairly constant
global topological properties. As preliminary steps, “silent” nodes were removed and the
(weakly) giant connected component was extracted (typically containing over 95% of the
original nodes). Density (∼ 10−4), average degree (2 ≤ 〈k〉t ≤ 5,∀t) or clustering (∼
10−3) display small differences across time. The networks are thus very sparse and highly
disassortative, in the sense that a few Twitter users get most of the retweeting activity, with
hardly any presence of triadic closure.
A. Community Sizes
In this work, one of the main motivations was to adopt a network approach to track
polarity evolution over time. In this direction, we disregard global (like the ones above) or
microscopical (node-level) properties, to focus on changes at the meso-scale or group level.
To do so, we applied a well-known community detection technique, namely label propagation
[33], as implemented in the C-coded igraph network analysis package [14]. This algorithm
has some highly desirable features. Apart from obtaining significant values in the modularity
optimization process (the higher the modularity Q, the better the quality of the resulting
partition), label propagation delivers excellent performance in terms of memory and time.
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The algorithm runs with some predefined constraints. First, we use a list of seed users
for whom the partisan leaning is out of any doubt, both in the Secularist and the Islamist
side [37]. Part of the list was taken from Mostak [29] with additional entries compiled in
2013 by an Egyptian expert[49]. Second, we limit the number of possible communities to
two –since we track for a bipolar political scenario in Egypt. Admittedly, it is possible that
the network structures (over time) allow for better, higher-Q partitions with more than two
communities, but that is beyond the scope of this work. Also, though Secularists and pro-
MI group members do not necessarily align, Islamists were more likely to be in the anti-MI
group than Secularists, as we show later. To provide an even more efficient running time,
we fed the network at time t with the labels obtained in the previous snapshot t− 1, when
possible (thousands of users enter and leave the network at each time step, in the latter case
nodes are unassigned initially, and the algorithm eventually imposes the corresponding tag
on it).
Under these considerations, the label propagation algorithm yields in general high mod-
ularity Q values: the average Q-value per snapshot is Q = 0.4340 with very few variation,
σQ = 0.0150. This implies that in terms of partition quality, communities remain fairly
constant over time. To have a solid standpoint regarding the quality of this result, we have
generated (and Q-optimized) 100 surrogate versions of the first snapshot. That particular
snapshot has an actual Q = 0.4431, whereas its random counterparts achieve an average
Q = 0.0468 with σQ = 0.091. This means the actual Q corresponds to a z-score of 4.3151,
i.e. it indeed represents a significant, far-from-random partition.
Figure 5 offers a time-resolved view of community size evolution. During the first days
of the time window –and up to the military intervention date– Secularists outnumbered
Islamists in the retweet network. On July 3, there was a crossover, and the number of
Islamists remained larger until the end of the period under study. Even in bursty periods,
where the network slices underwent severe changes (note for instance network sizes –red
line in Figure 5– around mid-August), Secularists did not (proportionally) recruit newcom-
ers, whereas the Islamist camp did. Unsurprisingly, the network size fluctuated over time,
specially as critical events unfold.
Note that it would be overly simplistic to assume “one Twitter user, one vote” and that
Twitter user counts perfectly match the proportion in society [17, 22, 28]. This holds both
for network-based measures as for content-based measures. Still, the trends in relative sizes
19
6/
21
 ·
6/
26
·
7/
1 ·
7/
6
7/
11 ·
7/
16
·
7/
21
7/
26
 ·
7/
31 · 8/
5 ·
8/
10
8/
15
·
8/
20
·
8/
25
8/
30
 ·
9/
4 ·
9/
9 ·
9/
14
9/
19
·
9/
24
·
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
gr
ou
p 
siz
e 
(pr
op
ort
ion
)
0.0
2.0×104
4.0×104
6.0×104
8.0×104
1.0×105
1.2×105
N
FIG. 5: Community sizes corresponding to Islamic (blue) and secular (orange) leanings. The red
line tracks the size of the network each day.
of the two camps might be more robust against selection bias and other skews.
B. Global Switching (Islamist vs. Secular)
As stated above, the Islamist dominance of the retweeting scene beyond the 3rd of July is
clear. The question remains whether secular sympathizers switched to Islamist positions (as
they overwhelmingly belong to the Anti-MI group), thus feeding the growth of the Islamist
group as observed in Figure 5. To check this, we measured the global switch ratio (Figure 6,
top panel) as the number of observed label switches (from t− 1 to t), over the total amount
of common nodes in the networks corresponding to t−1 and t. Notably, switching remained
at a very low level with a single exception (July 3) when it climbed up to 8%. In the lower
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with a few exceptions on key dates). Also, whenever swapping behavior exists, the direction of
these swaps are evenly shared between parties (again, with some exceptions on key dates).
panel of the same Figure, we show the proportion of swaps in either direction, across time.
Again, most of the time there is an evenly distributed amount of switching in both directions
(from Secular to Islamist, and vice versa) with a noteworthy exception on July 3, when 90%
of the switches occurred from a secular to an Islamist position. Though this could be due
to actual ideological turnover, it might also just point out that the focus of attention –as
expressed through retweeting behavior– is temporarily shifted towards the Islamists –whose
president is ousted on that day.
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C. Leaning histogram vs. Tweeting Activity
Besides a longitudinal (across time) view of the leaning evolution, we aggregated all this
information to provide soft labels per user. This was easily done either for the whole episode
(June 21 – September 30) or for some limited period of interest [t0, tf ]. For each user, we
calculated his soft label by adding up every time he was assigned an Islamist leaning and
normalizing this value by the total number of times he had been present in the network
over time. Thus, an li = 1 label means that user i was tagged as an Islamist for the whole
period under consideration. Labels can take values in the interval 0 ≤ l ≤ 1. In Figure 7
we placed these soft labels in a histogram (0.05 bin width; note log scale in the histogram
counts axis), to get a global view of the leaning landscape during the unfolding of events.
Top panel corresponds to soft labels in the pre-coup period (June 21 – July 3). During this
first period, seculars (leaning = 0) and moderate actors (0 < l < 0.5) outnumber Islamist
(l = 1) and pro-Islamic moderates (0.5 < l < 1); also, average activity in each of these
classes is significantly higher for the former. This scenario drastically changes for the second
period (bottom, July 4 – September 30), in which Islamists recruit many new users for their
side, as well as the average activity increases. On the secular side, activity drops as the size
of the party decreases in relative terms.
In coherence with Figure 5, the number of secular sympathizers is larger (top panel)
during the pre-coup period (those with l < 0.5), but the opposite is observed for the post-
coup period (lower panel). Furthermore, we computed the average strength (number of
retweets) per user and per day within each bin (red line in each panel). Clearly, those with
a secular leaning are (comparatively) much more active than Islamists during the initial
period, but the activity level flattens afterwards –with a slight advantage for the Islamist
side.
VII. DISCUSSION
At this point, we can attain a global picture of the temporal evolution of the events in
Egypt during the time window of interest. On one hand, content-based analysis showed
that some group pro-MI leaning tweets were flowing in Twitter, and they were especially
dominant during the brewing days before the military intervention in early July. Group
22
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
l (0=Secular, 1=Islamist)
102
103
104
105
co
u
n
ts
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
a
ve
ra
ge
 s
tre
ng
th
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 110
2
103
104
105
co
u
n
ts
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
a
ve
ra
ge
 s
tre
ng
thpre-coup: Jun 21 - Jul 3
post-coup: Jul 4 - Sep 30
FIG. 7: Polarization histograms and average per-day activity (red) for two different periods (pre-
and post-intervention, top and bottom panels respectively). Note logarithmic scale for histogram
counts (left).
anti-MI activity became dominant soon after July 3, with increasing bursts as violent events
unfold. On the other hand, political leaning in the retweet networks underwent a similar
transition, i.e. Secularists constitute a larger and more active group up to the coup d’etat,
but progressively decrease in number and activity thereafter. These two bipolar schemes
(pro/anti-MI, Secular/Islamist) with similar trajectories may lead to the conclusion that
Secularists have predominantly a pro-coup standpoint, while Islamist map onto an anti-
coup opinion. Such was the general interpretation being projected in classic mass media
during the summer of 2013 [2].
On closer inspection, the scenario turns out to be considerably more complex. If we
confront (content-based) group pro/anti-MI polarization scores and (network-based) Sec-
ularist/Islamic leaning soft labels for each Twitter users, a relatively strong correlation is
found (r ∼ 0.6, see Figure 8). This means that the leading trend in our analyses (which,
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correspond to the Secular camp, whereas Islamists are mapped onto higher ones.
noteworthy, have been obtained exploiting different facets of the data) exhibits a signifi-
cant alignment pro-MI-to-Secularists and anti-MI-to-Islamists; and yet such alignment is far
from perfect: ideally, leaning and polarity should meet around the diagonal in the scatter
plot. On closer inspection, most of the disagreement occurs on the Secularist side, whereas
there seems to be a rather univocal coherence in the Islamist side. Secularists exhibit rather
heterogeneous positions regarding the military intervention in the country’s politics.
A possible conclusion is that anti-Morsi protests were in fact quite diverse. In this direc-
tion, what we labeled here as Secularists might actually be conformed by a heterogeneous
collective, including seculars indeed, as well as people without political affiliations and even
small groups of Islamists –not necessarily with a pro-MI leaning. On the whole, Islamists
exhibited a solid anti-MI stance as the diverse contrarians progressively withdraw. As facts
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have evolved during this past year, our conclusions seem to grow stronger: indeed, the pro-
visional government led by General Sisi has prosecuted Islamist figures, but also groups or
individuals from other ideological stances [3].
Another observation that can be gleaned from our content- and network-based analyses
is that switching between pro- and anti-MI groups, and between Secularists and Islamists, is
rather limited. Most of the change in volume in observed polarized tweets seems to be mostly
due to each group becoming louder or quieter as time progresses. This is consistent with the
work of Chenoweth and Stephan [10] where they observed that members of opposing groups
in conflict do not necessarily switch sides to tip the balance in favor of one of the groups,
but they may merely withdraw their support.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we have analyzed how recent turmoil in Egypt in the period between June
21 and September 30, 2013 has transpired in Twitter. We examine the tweets from the
perspective of Secularists vs. Islamists and from the perspective of pro- and anti-military
intervention. The main lesson from our observations is that the military takeover on July 3
caused major quantitative (volume of polarized tweets), but not ideological (polarity swaps)
shifts among Twitter users. Secularist and pro-military intervention Twitter users were very
loud before the take-over, but became increasingly silent afterwards. Conversely, Islamists
and anti-military intervention Twitter users become significantly louder after the takeover.
Furthermore, a close inspection of our results indicate that the axis Secular/Islamist can
not be trivially mapped onto a pro/anti-coup opinion –which was the dominant assumption
in traditional media at the time of the military intervention. This is specially true for the
Secularist-to-pro-MI projection, which is not as aligned as it was generally presumed. The
development of the political situation in Egypt during the past year have confirmed our
insights.
To reach such conclusions we have exploited two methods, which rely on different (and
non-overlapping) aspects of our dataset: the semantic and the structural dimensions. Note-
worthy, the trends observed from these varied methodologies converge, on a qualitative
basis.
We are aware of the limitations of the present study. Besides the inherent biases in
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Twitter data [20], other arguments can be put forth. For instance, it is unlikely that an
individual publishes a radical change of opinion through a single medium, i.e. such attitude
has an associated social cost. Therefore, the availability of other sources (Facebook, blogs,
etc.) would be highly desirable. We stress, however, the precise nature of the events we
analyze here. We do not expect, in such bipolar scenario, that a Secularist might turn
Islamist (or viceversa). But it is possible –and even probable, given the turn of the events–
that Seculars who held high expectations for a government change, were afterwards deceived
as violence and repression grew. Expressing such discontent is not as costly –if it is at all.
For possible future directions, we aim to deeply analyze the motivation of users who
switched polarity to understand reasons for people to change leaning. We could see some
examples of users who withdraw support for the military intervention just after it occurred,
others after the violent crackdown of the Rabia sit-in, and others who supported the military-
intervention after opposing it in the beginning. This non-trivial switching temporal pattern
resembles that of “complex contagion”, for which a rich theoretical litearture is available [8],
in which early adopters (early switchers, in this case) pave the way for adoption (switching)
cascades. Another essential work direction is to add an additional polarization layer to the
Islamist/Secular classification. From the results we have obtained, there might be a missing
polarity, which could match old regime supporters (Mubarak’s regime). It is known that
these were heavily involved in the June 30 protests, and are the strongest supporters of the
army. Accounting for them would be interesting, and can give a more complete image of
the situation.
On a general framework, the work contributes to an understanding of bipolarized societies
–and these are not limited to Egypt: the underlying questions and methods are more widely
applicable. The turmoil in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine, the ongoing conflict in Palestine or
the Catholic/Anglican dichotomy in Northern Ireland might be other promising case studies.
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